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Abstract
We show that all the fundamental properties of competitive equilibrium in
Marshall’s cardinal theory of value, as presented in Note XXI of the mathematical
appendix to his Principles of Economics (1890), derive from the Strong Law
of Demand. That is, existence, uniqueness, optimality, and global stability of
equilibrium prices with respect to tatonnement price adjustment follow from the
cyclical monotonicity of the market demand function in the Marshallian general
equilibrium model.
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Introduction

Marshall in NOTE XXI of the mathematical appendix to his Principles of Economics
(1890) presents a fully articulated theory of general equilibrium in market economies.
This is not the partial equilibrium model with only two goods usually associated
with Cournot (1838), Dupuit (1844) or Marshall (1890), nor is it the partial equilibrium model exposited in the …rst chapter of Arrow and Hahn (1971), or in chapter
10 of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (MWG) (1995). Marshall’s general equilibrium model di¤ers in several essential respects from the general equilibrium model of
Walras (1900). In Marshall’s model there are no explicit budget constraints for consumers, the marginal utilities of incomes are exogenous constants and market prices
are not normalized. He “proves” the existence of market clearing prices, as does
Walras, by counting the number of equations and unknowns. Marshall’s …rst order
conditions for consumer satisfaction require the gradient of the consumer’s utility
function to equal the vector of market prices.
A recent modern exposition of the fundamental properties of Marhsall’s general
equilibrium model in NOTE XXI can be found in sections 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 of Bewley
(2007), where he calls it “short-run equilibrium.”As in Marshall, there are no explicit
We are pleased to thank Truman Bewley, Ben Polak, Mike Todd, and Francoise Forges for their
helpful remarks. This is a revision of CFDP 1615.
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budget constraints for consumers, the marginal utilities of incomes are exogenous
constants and market prices are not normalized. Consumers in Bewley’s model satisfy
Marshall’s …rst order conditions in a short-run equilibrium. Bewley proves that: (i)
a unique short-run equilibrium exists, (ii) welfare in a short-run equilibrium can
be computed using the consumer surplus of a representative consumer and (iii) the
short-run equilibrium is globally stable under tatonnment price adjustment.
We show that the fundamental properties of competitive equilibrium in Marshall’s
theory of value as derived in Bewley are immediate consequences of the market demand function satisfying the Strong Law of Demand, introduced by Brown and Calsamiglia (2007). A demand function is said to satisfy the Strong Law of Demand
if it is a cyclically monotone function of market prices. Cyclically monotone demand functions not only have downward sloping demand curves, in the sense that
they are monotone functions of market prices, but also their line integrals are pathindependent and hence provide an exact measure of the change in consumer’s welfare
in terms of consumer’s surplus for a given multidimensional change in market prices.
This is an immediate consequence of Roy’s identity applied to the indirect utility function for quasilinear utilities, where the marginal utility of income is one. Following
Quah (2000), we show that the Strong Law of Demand is preserved under aggregation across consumers. Hence the area under the market demand curve is an exact
measure of the change in aggregate consumer welfare for a given multidimensional
change in market prices.
Brown and Calsamiglia prove that a consumer’s demand function satis…es the
Strong Law of Demand, i¤ the consumer behaves as if she were maximizing a quasilinear utility function subject to a budget constraint. The de…ning cardinal property
of quasilinear utilities, say for two goods, is that the indi¤erence curves are parallel.
Consequently, quasilinear utility is measured on an interval scale. It is in this sense
that Marshall’s general equilibrium model is a cardinal theory of value, where di¤erences in a consumer’s quasilinear utility levels are a proxy for the consumer’s intensity
of preferences. The assumption of maximizing a quasilinear utility function subject
to a budget constraint is made by MWG in their discussion of partial equilibrium
analysis in the two good case, but there is no explicit mention of the Strong Law of
Demand in their analysis. In Bewley’s discussion of short-run equilibrium, there is
no explicit mention of the Strong Law of Demand or maximizing a quasilinear utility
function subject to a budget constraint.
Brown and Matzkin (1996) de…ne an economic model as refutable if there exists
a …nite data set consistent with the model and a second …nite data set that falsi…es
the model, where the model is the solution to a …nite family of multivariate polynomial inequalities. The unknowns in the inequalities are unobservable theoretical
constructs such as utility levels and marginal utilities of income. The parameters
in the inequalities are observable market quantities such as market prices, aggregate
demands and the income distribution. Using Bewley’s (1980) characterization of
the short-run equilibrium model as a representative agent model — see also sections
8.5 and 8.6 of his monograph — we propose a refutable model of Marshall’s cardinal theory of value. That is, there exists a …nite family of multivariate polynomial
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inequalities, the Afriat inequalities for quasilinear utilities derived by Brown and Calsamiglia, where the parameters are the market prices and aggregate demands and the
unknowns are the utility levels and marginal utilities of income of the representative
consumer. Brown and Calsamiglia show that these inequalities have a solution i¤ the
…nite data set consisting of observations on market prices and associated aggregate
market demands is cyclically monotone.
The fundamental di¤erence between the Marshallian and Walrasian theories of
value is the measurement scale for utility levels of consumers. In the Marshallian
model the measurement scale is cardinal, more precisely an interval scale, where the
family of indi¤erence curves is a metric space isometric to the positive real line. That
is, …x any open interval, I (x; +1) 2 R2++ and assume that the quasilinear utility
function U (x; y) = v(x) + y on R2++ is smooth, monotone and strictly concave. If
(x; y) 2 I then de…ne
(y)

f(x; y) 2 R2++ : U (x; y) = U (x; y)g;

i.e., the unique indi¤erence curve of U (x; y) passing through (x; y). is a one-to-one
map from the metric space I onto [U ], the family of indi¤erence curves for U . As
such, induces a metric on [U ], where if ( ; ) 2 [U ]
[U ], then
dist( ; )

1

(

( )

1

( ) :

1 is an isometric imbedding of [U ] into R
That is,
++ . Of course, this metric
+1
representation extends to quasilinear utilities on RN
of
the form
++

U (x; y) = v(x) + y where x 2 RN
++ and y 2 R++ :
1 is an isometric imbedding of [U ] into R
That is,
++ .
In the Walrasian model, the measurement scale for utility levels is an ordinal
scale, where only properties of consumer demand derivable from indi¤erence curves
are admissible in the Walrasian model, e.g., the marginal utility of income is not
an admissible property. Ordinal scales are su¢ cient for characterizing exchange e¢ ciency in terms of Pareto optimality or compensating variation or equivalent variation.
Unfortunately, a meaningful discussion of distributive equity requires interpersonal
comparisons of aggregate consumer welfare. If there is a representative consumer
endowed with a quasilinear utility function, then the equity of interpersonal changes
in aggregate consumer welfare is reduced to intrapersonal changes in the consumer
surplus of the representative consumer. Hence notions of distributional equity are
well de…ned and exact in the Marshallian cardinal theory of value.
We argue that rationalizing consumer demand with quasilinear cardinal utility
functions is comparable to rationalizing consumer demand with neoclassical ordinal
utility functions. In the latter case Afriat (1967) proved that neoclassical rationalization is refutable and in the former case, we extended his analysis to show that
quasilinear rationalization is also refutable. Hence in both cases, the debate about
the e¢ cacy of either the cardinal or ordinal model of utility maximization subject to
a budget constraint has been reduced to an empirical question that is resolvable in
polynomial time using market data.
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For ease of exposition we limit most of our discussion to pure exchange models
but, as suggested by the analysis short-run equilibrium in Bewley, all of our results
extend to Marshall’s general equilibrium model with production.
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A Cardinal Theory of Value

For completeness, we recall Afriat’s seminal (1967) theorem on rationalizing consumer
demand data (pr ; xr ), r = 1; 2; :::; N , with an ordinal utility function and the Brown–
Calsamiglia (2007) extension of Afriat’s theorem to rationalizing consumer demand
data with a cardinal utility function, i.e., a quasilinear utility function. Afriat showed
that the …nite set of observations of market prices and consumer demands at those
prices can be rationalized by an ordinal utility function i¤ there exists a concave, continuous, non-satiated utility function that rationalizes the data. That is, there exists
a concave, continuous, non-satiated utility function U , such that for r = 1; 2; :::; N :
U (xr ) =

max

pr x pr xr

U (x):

Moreover, this rationalization is equivalent to two other conditions: (1) The “Afriat
inequalities”:
Uj Uk + k pk (xj xk ) for j; k = 1; 2; :::; N
are solvable for utility levels Ur and marginal utilities of income r and (2) the data
satis…es cyclical consistency, a combinatorial condition that generalizes the strong law
of revealed preference to allow thick indi¤erence curves. See Varian (1982) for proofs.
Brown and Calsamiglia showed that the data can be rationalized by a quasilinear utility function i¤ the Afriat inequalities have a solution where the r = 1. Moreover,
they show that quasilinear rationalization is equivalent to another combinatorial condition on the data, cyclical monotonicity. Rockafellar (1970) introduced the notion of
cyclical monotonicity as a means of characterizing the subgradient correspondence of
a convex function. For smooth strictly concave functions f the gradient map @f (x)
is cylically monotone if for all …nite sequences (pt ; xt )Tt=1 , where pt = @f (xt ):
x1 (p2

p1 ) + x2 (p3

p3 ) +

+ xT (p1

pT )

0:

Hildenbrand’s (1983) extension of the law of demand to multicommodity market
demand functions requires the demand function to be monotone. He showed that it is
monotone if the income distribution is price independent and has downward sloping
density. Subsequently, Quah (2000) extended Hildenbrand’s analysis to individual’s
demand functions. His su¢ cient condition for monotone individual demand is in
terms of the income elasticity of the marginal utility of income. Assuming that the
commodity space is Rn++ , we denote the demand function at prices p 2 Rn++ by x(p).
This demand function satis…es the law of demand or is monotone if for any pair
p; p0 2 Rn++ of prices
(p p0 ) [x(p) x(p0 )] < 0:
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This means, in particular, that the demand curve of any good is downward sloping
with respect to its own price, i.e., satis…es the law of demand if all other prices are
held constant. We denote the Marshallian consumer optimization problem by (M ):
max
n

xi 2R++

1

gi (xi )

p xi

i

where gi is a smooth, strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function on Rn++ ,
i is the exogenous marginal utility of income, p is the vector of market prices and
xi is the consumption bundle. In this model there are no budget constraints and
prices are not normalized. This speci…cation of the consumer’s optimization problem
rationalizes the family of equations de…ning Marshall’s general equilibrium model
(absent production) in his NOTE XXI.
Theorem 1 If there are I consumers, where each consumer i’s optimization problem
is given by (M ), then the market demand function satis…es the Strong Law of Demand.
Proof. Let hi (p) = 1i gi (xi (p)) p xi (p) be the optimal value function for (M )
for consumer
P i. Applying the envelope
P theorem wePknow that @hi (p) = xi (p).Let
H(p) = Ii=1 hi (p), then @H(p) = Ii=1 @hi (p) = Ii=1 xi (p). Therefore the marP
PI
ket demand at prices p is X(p) = Ii=1 xi (p) =
@H(p). Since
i=1 @hi (p) =
hi (p) is a concave function, @hi (p) and @H(p) are cyclically monotone — see
Theorem 24.8 in Rockafellar (1970). Hence, the market demand function X(p) satis…es the Strong Law of Demand.
Corollary 2 The Marshallian general equilibrium model has a unique equilibrium
price vector that is globally stable under tatonnment price adjustment.
Proof. Every cyclically monotone map is a monotone map. That is, market demand
functions satisfying the Strong Law of Demand a fortiori satisfy the Law of Demand.
Hildenbrand (1983) shows that economies satisfying the Law of Demand have a unique
equilibrium price vectors that are globally stable under tatonnment price adjustment.
Corollary 3 Aggregate consumer welfare in the Marshallian general equilibrium model
can be computed using consumer surplus.
Proof. Brown and Brown (2007) show that this is a property of cyclically monotone
demand functions. To prove that the Marshallian general equilibrium model is
refutable, we will …rst show that it can be described as a representative agent model,
as originally suggested by Bewley (1980). The representative agent’s utility function
in Bewley’s Marshallian model is given by the following social welfare function:
" I
#
X 1
W (e) =
max
gi (xi )
fx1 ;:::;xI g2RnI
++

s.t.

I
X

i=1

xi = e:

i=1

5

i

Bewley shows that (p; x(p)) is an equilibrium of the exchange economy with consumers f(gi ; i )gIi=1 and social endowment e i¤
e = arg max fW (e)
N
e2R++

peg:

Equivalently, for a given e, the price vector p such that e = arg maxe2RN fW (e) peg
++
will be the unique competitive equilibrium price vector for this exchange economy.
Let H(p) = maxe2RI fW (e) p eg, then it follows that
++

H(p)

T
X

ht (p)

t=1

if p is a competitive equilibrium vector of prices. Hence
@H
@p

=
p

T
X
t=1

@H
@p

=
p

T
X

xt (p) = x(p) = e:

t=1

The equilibrium map p(e) is again the inverse of the demand function of the representative consumer. From Rockafellar (1970, p. 219), Corollary 23.5.1 we know that
if g is a continuous concave function on RI++ then p 2 @g(x) i¤ x 2 @h(p). It
follows from this duality relationship that p is the unique equilibrium price vector
for the social endowment e if and only if p = (@W=@e)je=e and (@H=@p)jp = e.
Given a …nite set of observations on social endowments and market clearing prices,
we can now characterize the refutable implications of Marshall’s theory of value. A
given data set rationalizes Marshall’s general equilibrium model if and only if it is
cyclically monotone.
Theorem 4 The equilibrium map, p(e), in Marshall’s general equilibrium model is
cyclically monotone in e, the social endowment.
Proof. Because gi is strictly concave, W (e) is strictly concave as well. By Theorem
24.8 in Rockafellar (1970) we know that the gradient map of a concave function is
cyclically monotone, which implies that the gradient map ~e ! (@W=@e)je=e = p is
cyclically monotone.
All of our results: existence, uniqueness, optimality, tatonnment stability and
refutability extend to the Marshallian general equilibrium model with production.
Optimality, tatonnment stability and refutability follow from the well-known duality result in convex analysis that the supply function is the gradient of the pro…t
function or conjugate of the cost function. As such, the supply function is also cyclically monotone .The cyclical monotonicity of aggregate supply and aggregate demand
guarantee (i) that producer and consumer surplus are well de…ned, (ii) that the excess
demand function is cyclically monotone and (iii) that the aggregate demand function
and the aggregate supply function are refutable. As in Bewley (2007), existence is
shown by maximizing the representative agent’s utility function over the compact
6

set of feasible production plans. If this set is strictly convex then the optimum is
unique and the supporting prices are the equilibrium prices. See Bewley’s chapter
8 on short-run equilibria for detailed proofs of existence, uniqueness, optimality and
tatonnment stability. Refutability follows from Brown and Calsamiglia.
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